Thursday, September 25, 2008

The New World Disorder

Some Christians believe that the anti-Christ shall soon rise; thereafter; it is believed that he shall convince all of the nations of the world to join together in peace—only to backpedal on his utopian promises in order that everyone must worship him afterward, for the devil shall simultaneously trick society into raising one army out of our unity, which will thereafter be under his control, even unto the point whereby the masses of the world shall be unable to counter such might.
One would hope, however, that society would not be so illogical.
What use would there be for a large military force if the world is one nation?
How could the devil convince us of a need for invincible “defense” if the world is already united?
Let us say that Satan tempts us to maintain a “police force” in order to deal with small bands of “criminals.” This may be reasonable, assuming, of course, that the “police” are given weapons that are only slightly better than those maintained by those whom are “evil;” however, if this were so, Satan’s army would hardly be undefeatable, as “rogues” would have a chance to evolve—unless, of course, the devil convinces us to allow the police to upgrade their weaponry a great deal ahead of time. In such a case, however, one would hope that our soldiers would not be so idiotic as to use deadly force against virtually unarmed civilians, and that our scientists would not be so close-minded as to ignore the fact that the weapons they are creating are ten times more powerful, if not a hundred times superior, than those of the best criminals. It is not as if we arm the majority of our current police with fully automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades, although even these weapons could be countered if the inferior weapons of the masses are combined together—one “policeman” with an automatic rifle is not superior to five citizens with semi-automatics; one would hope that the people of the world would not put up with martial law for long, especially in the case whereby the police may be harming the innocent.
There is always a chance that our “friends” will betray us, of course.

Even so, humanity may be right to desire a “New World Order.”
True order, however, is difficult to fathom.
It is important to be able to defend one’s self from attack. Yet, at the very least, one must not make their defense so overpowering that such is harmful to themselves, and to their friends. And surely, we understand that it is outright wrong for the police to enter a person’s home in order to prevent them from committing a crime that they have not yet carried out; we can arrest people for conspiracy, but we must have strong evidence for such plans beforehand: we can not simply detain people that may be inclined towards wrongdoing. For if we think it is logical to stop crime simply because a person could be a danger to society, the entire population must be arrested immediately, as any living human being has the potential to commit acts of illegality under unfavorable circumstances.

Those that sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither.
--Benjamin Franklin

Paradoxically, although the United States have given up far too many of our individual rights on a national level—on an International level—we need to be exceptionally more open and cooperative. These two problems are related, to some extent, in that our enormous military forces are a major reason for our personal slavery and high taxes. We have become so concerned with “saving” the world that we do not realize we are hardly helping anyone given the incredible amount of money that we pour into our government: we easily believe tanks and bombs will bring us peace and stability, and that such forces create goodwill around the world for our form of “Democracy,” but in the end, we are fools, and the vast majority of us—even our politicians—are virtually unaware of the repercussions.
The United States, Canada, England, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and many more of our International brothers and sisters, have pledged to defend one another militarily, even unto the point whereby we shall regard an actual attack upon an ally as an attack upon ourselves.
Nevertheless, the recent War in Iraq proves that our individual nations maintain sovereignty over our forces, which is spectacular, as this conflict was one of preemption, which is well beyond the scope of the formal NATO agreement, although, to be certain, the terms and conditions of NATO membership are somewhat grey to begin with, even in the instance that a real attack does occur against a state in the union. However, at the very least, NATO did respond somewhat after September 11th; to this day, the organization provides the United States with a fair amount of assistance in Afghanistan.
Some, however, believe that NATO should do much more in order to help the United States in our “War on Terror;” after all, the International independence of NATO has been somewhat surprising as of late, for the United States held no reservations in aiding Europe in Kosovo, insofar that we were the dominant force of the conflict, despite the fact that Europe likely benefited much more than us in their desire to cast aside poor refugees from their borders.
United States citizens certainly have a reason to be distrustful towards NATO, especially when confrontations with rogue states are more offensive than not, but surely, we understand that, at the very least, the nations of NATO would aid one another in the case of a completely unwarranted military invasion of a member nation by another major world power (such as Russia, or China); do we not?
Let us be honest: some of us fear that many NATO countries would not aid the United States even slightly defensively in a large confrontation—much less in the event of an unfair full-scale nuclear war against our nation.
We have ignored many major historical European battles throughout history, after all.
And yet, even the more paranoid among us likely find a possible war against Holland, Spain, and Germany to be unlikely. If not, the odds of a betrayal by Britain are very small; correct?
Britain has even provided a decent amount of aid for the United States’ War in Iraq!
But if we do not agree that we can trust Britain to defend us in the event of an uncalled for nuclear attack against our innocent people, surely, we must wonder how Iraq will ever work. After all, the British share a culture and heritage with the United States—we even use their common laws when we are in doubt over our own. It is not as if the Canadians fear the treachery of their closest ally, although they risk far more than the United States in the case of a failure on the behalf of the U.K to defend them, as the United States alone are easily far more of a potential threat to the Canadians than the Chinese and the Russians are to the United States—Canada does not even possess nuclear weaponry.
Indeed, the Canadians (who may still technically be “British,” in that they recognize the same monarch, despite their complete independence over their national affairs) have even figured out a way to work with the Quebecans: this should be surprising, as the latter are of more French ancestry than English, despite the fact that France is supposedly England’s mortal enemy.
Of course, to this day, many people in Quebec desire independence from Canada—despite the fact that the movement thus far has been mostly non-violent: strangely, the French are the primary reason why the United States gained “freedom” ourselves (they even directly aided us); historically speaking, does this not make one wonder why many U.S. citizens hold reservations in naming a certain food “french fries,” even according to the “traditional” definition of the dish? In researching the American history of fried potatoes, one may discover their connection with Thomas Jefferson, although, even more historically speaking, if we are to rename the food, it would likely be best to associate it with the Belgians rather than the French, especially considering the fact that the Belgians were not politically free when the food became popular—they were a part of the French empire.
Nevertheless, let us ignore the French, despite our love/hate relationship.
In the year 2005: Canadian GDP was worth 1.11 trillion dollars; Britannian GDP was worth 1.818 trillion dollars; Australian GDP was worth 635 billion dollars.
Altogether, these three countries’ GDP was valued at 4 trillion dollars.
The United States GDP was worth 12.49 trillion dollars during the same period.
If our four nations were to truly trust one another, insofar that we would form a military union of a purely defensive and peaceful purpose, inasmuch that we would not even commit counter-invasions of encroaching enemies’ lands whose territories were not originally a part of our own—much less inasmuch that we would not conduct preemptive invasions of enemies’ lands—in the long-run, we would be able to grow incredibly faster from both economic and militaristic points of view, while we would still be able to maintain the most essential elements of our liberty and security.
Our ability to form a joint military self defense force should not require an enormous leap of faith, as our four countries are already vastly cooperative in many respects—economically, politically, religiously, and militarily; however, the reason for such a force may need some explanation.
For although some may think that we are fantastic friends with one another now, even unto the point whereby we already have such an unspoken, if not formal union between us—if I were a citizen of these other three nations, I would not be so sure that we are in as good of relations as the United States pretend to be. To be certain, the United States are quite powerful on our own.
Perhaps a metaphor may be best.
To see why our security is more than likely in the case of an invasion, imagine a scenario whereby all four of our countries combine our might in sports during the winter and summer Olympics.
Considering the Canadians won 24 medals in the 2006 winter Olympics, while the United States earned 25, there is no doubt that a Canadian alliance would be of great use to us. With our medals combined, we would have a total of 49, which would result in our union holding 20 more medals than our next closest competitor—Germany. We may need to worry, perhaps, if Germany joins together with Austria, who earned 23 medals at the time (this would mean they would outnumber our total medal count by 2); nevertheless, our four nations may still earn more medals than thus in reality, as the United States and Canada diversified our medals in more disciplines, which might make our combined power relatively stronger in some respects, as there would be less overlap in our forces, especially with the small, yet meaningful contribution of Great Britain, which earned one medal during these games. To be certain, a German and Austrian alliance would provide a challenge; nevertheless, in the case that these two nations are slightly victorious, we would surely have our revenge in the summer.
In the summer Olympics of 2004, the United States easily outranked most nations of the world in our attainment of medals. Our total count was 102, while our next closest competitor, Russia, only earned 92; even so, U.S. medals were more slanted towards gold and silver when compared with those of the Russians, which makes our theoretical power greater, qualitatively speaking. And yet, Britain earned 30 medals in these games, while Australia earned 49. If we combine our medals with Britain and Australia alone (Canada is not a great friend of the summer Olympics, despite their 12 medals), our total medal count will rise to 181. Even in the case of an alliance between Russia and China (the later earned 63 medals), the forces of our four nations would easily triumph any other power in the summer.
Germany is not nearly as dominate in the summer as they are in the winter; Austria is most certainly not a summer force to be reckoned with. Yet, if these later two nations combine with Russia and China for all games, we would most certainly face a competitive problem of immense proportions.
Nevertheless, anthropologically speaking, it would probably be much more difficult for the foreign four to stay united than it would be for us; unless, perhaps, they all embrace “Communism.”
Then again, Communism is not necessarily helpful in uniting nations—the United States’ alliance with China during the Cold War proves this. In truth, the Germans and the Austrians would not likely desire to join with any other major force of the world before they may join that of our four nations. After all, Germany could be considered to be “Anglo-Saxon;” we surely share a good amount of language (we also share terminology with the French as a result of the Normans, although we are still ignoring them). In reality, however, if we wish to “stretch” the overlapping of western culture, most of Europe could be included in our union: our more ancient forefathers spoke Latin as the official language of the world; to this day, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and philosophers carry the tradition onward—to some extent (even many “common” English words were adopted from the Latin tongue). Yet, if Germany alone joined with us and our other Englishmen, we may, quite simply, be too powerful for our own good. Let us not be too in-depth with our understanding of anthropology, therefore.
If we are to do so, eventually, we shall find a reason to unite with everyone!
Indeed, if we dig deeply enough, and if we continue to ally ourselves with countries that share “culture,” there shall not be a point in the Olympics as a method of determining cultural dominance, so let us simply ignore this “game analysis,” as we can have fun, so long as we compete with one another for a peaceful end.
After all, sports are often looked upon as being metaphors for warfare; correct?
When the 1980 United States’ hockey team defeated the Soviet Unions’, we considered it to be a “miracle.” The win gave us hope militaristically, as if the Cold War had drastically shifted in our favor merely by a few pucks hitting some netting.
Therefore, for purposes of precision, let us directly examine a military alliance between those four nations that we more easily perceive to be the closest to ourselves (the English ones), for true warfare is surely not entertaining when one’s friends and family are made to join the dust of the Earth.
For when we analyze the militaristic capabilities of the United States alone, we shall find the truth, which is to say that the U.S. Olympic hockey win was of little additional benefit to our defensive purposes of the Cold War. At the very least, one can be certain that the United States were secure from an invasion by the Soviet Union for decades, even without the aid of our friends.
In the end, we feared their nuclear weapons just as much as they feared our own.
The reality, of course, is this: as far as modern warfare is concerned—the major nations of the world are in a stalemate—we rely upon mutually assured destruction, and little else.
However, if a reader in the United States does not believe the last declaration—they should find it even more worthwhile to unite with Canada, Britain, and Australia, for our freedom and happiness depend upon our ability to simply defend ourselves from violence, and surely, if we are not already an aggressive country, we could build a large army to counter any force of the world if we are able to survive in isolation and peace for a long enough time: the combined natural resources of Canada and the United States are staggering, and Australia and Britain would aid our cause greatly in their intellectual capacities, although their lands in particular would be fantastic worldwide naval bases.
Even so, in reality, at this moment in time, the United States truly are capable of defending all four of our nations single-handedly in any worldwide military alliance that could plausibly be considered to be against us—even by conventional means—assuming that other nations would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in WWIII, which would be quite idiotic on their behalf.
At the very least, however, by uniting with these three other English powers, we could reduce our arms a great deal, and spread out part of the burden, which would allow for our citizenry to at least save some money in taxes and/or interest on our national debt: this will be proved shortly.
These other English people are quite prideful, which is to be respected; although some readers in the United States may not agree with this a priori, the combined forces of Canada, Australia, and Britain would also more than likely be able to single-handedly repel most conventional worldwide military alliances against them, for they would only need to make warfare much more costly for their enemies than peace; Britain also possesses adequate weapons of mass destruction, of course.
And yet, we are already far too ahead of ourselves.
We have not even discussed general military expenditures yet!
Let us do so: the United States, Canada, Australia, and Britain spend far more on our annual (much less decadal) militaries than do any other people on Earth.
This is a rough list of worldwide military expenditures in 2005 alone:

World Total $1,000,000,000,000

1) United States $478,200,000,000
2) European Union $216,961,000,000 (2006 Est.)
3) United Kingdom $48,300,000,000
4) France $46,200,000,000
5) Japan $42,100,000,000
5) People's Republic of China $41,000,000,000

As can be seen from this simple tally, the United States and the United Kingdom alone spent over $510,000,000,000 on our military forces of 2005; this means, quite simply, that our two nations were responsible for over half of the world’s total economic procurement of weaponry.
Some, of course, may argue that China’s real defense figure in 2005 was roughly three times more than what is stated, and similar assertions are given every year as a justification for even greater U.S. and European spending in the future, but then again, this should not make sense to us: if the United States are so concerned with Chinese military spending, surely, the Chinese must have a far better excuse to increase their own expenditure levels, as we would still have vastly outspent them in this single year alone, even with such a liberal figure in their favor (especially since the Chinese have very old equipment in their arsenal). Indeed, even if we are to say that the Chinese spent $400 billion on their military of 2005, which would be an incredibly high estimate (even some of the more radical war hawks in America may not believe this), a Chinese attempt at invasion should not concern us, as the United States alone would be said to have spent more than 17% of what the Chinese invested militarily during this timeframe, while our spending would be a great deal more from a certain point of view (when one considers more specific facts), which will be presented momentarily (at the very least, the reader is likely aware that historical United States’ military spending is even more proportionally higher than that of China’s, as the latter only recently became a major economic power).
Surely, however, mere culture alone would not be the major reason for the British and the Canadians to support the United States in a war to end Chinese aggression. Canada would be frightened of a reckless Chinese force beneath them, and Australia would not wish for Hawaii and other island territories to fall into the hands of a potential enemy that is more likely to attack them—Britain would not wish for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to become a part of an enemy superpower.
And yet, Canadian and Australian military expenditures have not even been listed yet: both of these nations spent $10 billion a piece on their militaries of 2005. Of course, in the cases of Canada and Australia, their amounts are not as proportionate to their GDP as are the United States’ and Britain’s, but then again, this may not be a bad thing. Their citizens may simply feel that their big brothers spend too much on military affairs, which is likely a good sign, as they are probably very nice and well-mannered people, and trust our current alliance a great deal already, inasmuch that they will not likely have too much of a problem working with us on what I propose. When we combine all of the military expenditures of our four English comrades, we find that our nations would have spent 36.5% more on our 2005 forces than even the most paranoid estimates of the military funding of China presume.
However, if the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia continue to be so hypothetically disadvantaged against the Chinese, even unto the point whereby China truly is able to spend 4.5% of their GDP on military expenditures while adeptly maintaining an average rate of GDP growth at 9% for many more years into the future, along with their large trade surpluses and relatively low public debt (they do have high marginal returns to capital and an enormous potential labor force), we would probably be wise to not cast aside the Japanese economic powerhouse, as the latter nation has been extremely loyal to the United States in recent years: we could be fairly certain that the Japanese would not wish for China to gain an enormous military advantage over American islands throughout the Pacific, although we may simply be thought of as being a beneficial buffer to them. Indeed, South Korea would also not likely desire a Chinese dominated Asia. If anything, China would be more likely to invade Japan and/or South Korea before they ponder attacking the United States directly, even though they would severely weaken themselves in multiple ways before they would turn to our shores.
With either Japan or South Korea as a part of our mostly English alliance, we would surely maintain an enormous financial and technological advantage over the Chinese for some time heading into the future, as our naval and air basing capabilities alone would thereafter become extremely broad. Even if the South Koreans are our sole ally in the region, and if Japan allies with China in a war (which is highly unlikely), the South Koreans could hold a small portion of their peninsula until English reinforcements arrive (even if we ignore the South Koreans—Chinese and Japanese finances would be in ruins before they could take South Korea conventionally—the South Koreans are in a much better position than Vietnam was against the United States; at the very least, one could be certain that the South Koreans could make a war more costly to the others than it would be beneficial, as the South Korean economy would be worth far less if its advanced labor force were destroyed in a war).
But of course, all of this is very abstract and theoretical (to say the least).
For even if we are to say that the Chinese are already equal to us militarily and economically, which they surely are not, and even if they ally with Japan and/or South Korea, they would not be able to counter Britain, Canadian, Australian, and American conventional defenses. We would easily be able to fight conservative battles much more effectively than they could engage us aggressively—assuming, of course, that our generals would not be completely idiotic in comparison to those of the enemy. After all, the Asian alliance would need to defeat our navies first and foremost, and the British navy is no small threat, despite the fact that the Japanese navy is quite powerful in its own right. The South Korean navy would also pose a significant threat to the Australian and Canadian oceanic forces, even though the latter two nations would benefit a great deal from their rather distant locations. In the end, however, if our four English nations fought defensively, we could rely upon our air forces much more than the enemy could, which would easily tip the oceanic theater of war in our favor, disregarding the fact that it would be easier for us to refurnish our ships with fuel, equipment, and manpower.
Of course, if there is still any doubt in this, we could possibly plead unto the French for aid—we would be at least somewhat more victorious. At the very least, it is unarguable that the French could distract the enemy’s forces decently enough (but even if the enemy somehow defeated our navies, they would have still not touched our armies, of course).
However, we may need to worry, perhaps, if India joins together with the other Asian forces (it is also possible that Russia may join them), but in that type of a scenario, we would probably be able to count on the rest of Europe’s aid, as the latter would probably not wish for such an aggressive and powerful alliance near their eastern front. It would surely be foolish for Western Europe to watch North America and Britain fall without responding, as they would lose significant trading partners in the process (their economies would probably be in a severe depression with the rest of the world at war, although they could become quite rich in the long-run by financing the conflict while maintaining high birth rates).
Nevertheless, the simple fact of the matter is this: in the real world, the Chinese military is not nearly equal to that of the United States; the Japanese and the South Koreans are more aligned with the west than the east; the Indians are somewhat indifferent at the moment; most importantly, the world would hardly become engaged in such an enormous conflict without eventually launching nuclear weapons (if America was being overrun, would we not choose liberty over death?).
But let us be even more detailed and specific in our political/economical analysis of militaristic possibilities, as an expenditure argument is hardly more relevant than the Olympic one; the reason that I wasted the reader’s time with a senseless “funding” debate is simple: our western politicians are those that often argue the need for more and more enormous military expenditures based upon citations of nations’ percentages of military spending as a proportion of foreign nations’ GDP (such assertions often do make enemy spending seem higher), but even then, politicians must often use such arguments in combination with highly improbable shifts in political alliances; and even then, they must still live in a world of extreme fantasy: but surely, increased Chinese, Russian, and Indian percentages may seem threatening (if we ignore nuclear weapons), especially when it is now commonly believed that an enormous defense industry is the best way in which to develop technology.
In truth, it is easy to assert that technology is created through military spending when a large amount of a society’s scientists are employed in the defense industry, but it is not as if Einstein developed the theory of relativity in a militaristic state; we would be fools to ignore that Switzerland has remained free from conflict throughout the modern age, despite their relative non-interventionism and peaceful deposition. For the Swiss could create an extremely potent military force if they were given America’s resources (and a reason to need such powerful arms). However, if Switzerland is not a proof that modern warfare is hardly economical, then perhaps Sudan is a proof that modern warfare is not economical.
But let us set aside the examples of these latter two foreign nations (along with the examples of many African and South American nations, which I shall not mention), for these are very simple arguments of peace, and I shall have many more pages to write if we ignore them. It should be obvious, however, that mere digits of defense appropriations are not specific as to what such spending is aimed towards—it is not as if buying golden bullets would develop a military (or technology) anymore than the purchase of many more leaden bullets would for a much smaller amount of money. Would it not be more effective to create cheaper weaponry when the point of the military is to splatter as many of the invading enemies’ brains on the homeland’s ground as is humanly possible?
So, let us describe our military forces in more detail.
Once again, the most important element of defense for Canada, Britain, Australia, and the United States is our naval capability. It is not as if most of the world can cross the ocean efficiently; therefore, the money that we spend in this area is far more worthwhile than that which we may spend in any other, as such appropriations are automatically given an enormous intrinsic boost as a result of the water of the world. Indeed, there is little doubt that our four nations’ conventional navies are vastly superior to any similar force of the entire world combined—many nations of the Earth are landlocked, after all.
Even if the Chinese, Indian, Russian, and continental European armies are exceptionally better and more numerous than that of our alliance, it would be a logistical nightmare for them to move hundreds of millions of troops across the Atlantic and/or the Pacific—especially all at once, although any bottleneck of their forces would significantly reduce their numerical superiority, even though any boat is a type of a bottleneck to begin with: landing craft would be exceptionally exposed to machine guns and artillery, as evidence by the U.S assault of Normandy in WWII, despite our incredible naval and air superiority during the battle. In modern times, enemy aircraft are far more accurate at hitting their targets, which may be problematic for the British in certain European scenarios; however, any beachhead defense would also be far more mobile than in times of old—even the use of ballistic missiles by an enemy would be exceptionally ineffective against a dispersed and informed modern English army unit, and reconnaissance would make it nearly impossible to land a force on any of our shores without granting our forces an especially significant warning ahead of time.
Using large airliners to carry millions of paratroopers and their equipment would be even more costly to an enemy than transporting them by boat, even though they would still be vulnerable to attack by our destroyers and frigates in the middle of the ocean (and to our land based aircraft): if our military is as efficient as they claim to be against ballistic missiles, surely, an enemy would need to develop incredibly efficient planes in order to transport the tons of land forces necessary to invade our nations without suffering heavy losses from the less advanced surface-to-air missiles in our arsenal.
In short, in order to invade any of our lands, the entire world would need to secretly form an alliance, and create an enormous amount of new technology within a few years (in order to defeat our current methods of conventional defense), and even then, they would likely suffer extremely heavy losses at the very least.
Would this not be extremely improbable, especially given the fact that the entire world would also need to counter our nuclear weapons (and if they could counter our nuclear weapons, should we not prioritize research and development in this area first and foremost)?
And how would any force in the world be so politically adept as to unite against us if we truly became a peaceful nation that only used pure defense to begin with?
Of course, although the South Americans may use their ground forces somewhat efficiently against the United States’ and Canada’s, this would still be a difficult task for them, especially given the amount of Apache helicopters in the United States’ arsenal—these aircraft are horrible to use in aggressive assaults, but they are brutal when they are safely kept behind one’s front lines. However, although the Germans once attempted to use Mexico against the United States in World War I, as evidenced by the famed Zimmerman telegram, the Mexicans have shown that they are smart enough to avoid any such scenario, even though they were promised to have “their” land back, which we conquered during our drive towards our Manifest Destiny.
And yet, even if the world’s forces somehow amass in South America and successfully invade us (temporarily), we could always rely upon Australia and Britain to be a safe haven of some sort until we regroup and retake certain portions of North America again, although the British have admittedly created a massive tunnel that extends all the way to France underneath the ocean. Surely, we may need to set bombs around the latter area in order to guarantee our survivability.
But of course, in reality, all of this is still nothing but abstract fantasy.
It is more detailed than most political arguments, but we are not done yet.
If we revert to our military expenditure argument, however, we shall find that Mexico is not even ranked above Israel in nominal military spending (Israel spends twice as much money on arms, despite the fact that Mexico’s economy is ten times larger than Israel’s); indeed, the later Jewish state could be considered to be part of U.S. defense spending, although we shall not include such in this analysis for simplicity, even though the world hardly revolves around Israel. But in the case that the Universe was made for the Jews, U.S. military spending won’t help them much more than God will. It is doubtful that Moses wrote a check before he parted the Red Sea.
Indeed, let us be realistic for just a moment, for there are only two countries south of the United States that are remotely hostile to any of our four English nations: one is Cuba, which is on an island, and the other is Venezuela, which is more of a country of comic relief rather than a threat.
I certainly do not condone the governments of either aggressive South American nations, but neither are credible problems to the security of the United States, unless, perhaps, they are to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, which, once again, we have not really considered in our detailed analysis of worldwide military forces thus far.
The only South American country that could hope to mount any type of conventional attack against the United States is probably Brazil, but then again, what reason do the Brazilians have to be upset with us—aside from the ethanol tariff mentioned in a prior section of this book?
I could certainly see Brazil being upset with the United States and England if the two of us join together in a soccer alliance, and perhaps they may join together with Argentina, especially if we begin playing basketball better, but let us conquer one issue at a time; shall we?
Let us stop beating around the bush!
We have hardly any reason whatsoever to fear an invasion of the United States!
The Nazis could not even successfully invade Britain, much less North America.
The United States have not been invaded by a truly threatening force for nearly 200 years!
Would any nation of the world be able to generate a Blitzkrieg underneath our powerful radar screens and out of the watch of our many satellites (and those of our allies’)?
Would it even be possible to invade a handful of rural towns before the event is broadcast on television, or merely communicated by our people through cellular phones?
Paul Revere warned our forefathers with a horse!
When Pearl Harbor was attacked, significant parts of our military were destroyed at a time when we needed them the most, but then again, Pearl Harbor should have been completely avoidable to begin with (it is actually a proof of a major point herein), especially when one considers how ignorant our commanders were at the time; how did we build so many weapons and then virtually turn away from all of our early warning systems, insofar that we let a great deal of our Navy rot in a concentrated area during a period of high tension in the world?
Even if we qualify a weapons system as being necessary in a case of outright paranoia on our behalf, merely building weaponry is pointless when we do not have the slightest idea as to how to use such effectively.
But if we are going to remember World War Two, we should think about the end of the war instead of the beginning. Perhaps then the reader will begin to see the greater points that we shall make before we analyze our modern military in truly specific detail. For the Japanese were much more surprised and injured from the Atomic bomb than we were from Pearl Harbor (the second bomb was more of an insult than an injury), and it would be idiotic to not discuss such weaponry any longer.
How many of us ask ourselves why we needed to drop such devices on an island that was completely surrounded by a naval blockade, inasmuch that many Japanese people were starving to death, especially considering the Russians were soon to declare war upon Japan when the Soviets were the largest army in the world?
Should it not have been worthwhile for us to have waited for Russia considering we paid for such by dividing Korea and Vietnam?
We surely know now what the Japanese were thinking; correct?
We did have a great amount of intelligence on the country in 1944—even more so than some may take into consideration, although many prominent historians have claimed that the Japanese would have likely surrendered with or without the gigantic bombs on our side: Eisenhower, Einstein, and many other historical people of importance detested our atomic “usefulness;” even MacArthur disagreed with nuking Japan, despite his later desire to use such weaponry in Korea. Virtually “two men” decided to kill innocent women and children, although their staff likely played some role in convincing them to make the order a reality. Nevertheless, most standardized history books only give the naive account of United States’ nationalism and militarism: surely, our own leaders could not be fanatical terrorists—no, this could not be the case; this is the lie that we tell ourselves every day we look in the mirror.
But if we argue against the above paragraph, and instead, assert that a complete naval blockade and the largest army in the entire world were not enough to bring the Japanese to their knees, even though we also maintained nearly complete air superiority over them, then what is the point in almost all of our conventional weaponry?
Does not anybody ever wonder how many atomic weapons the United States have in our possession, what their benefits may be, and how much we pay for them?
If they are such a great weapon, surely, we must generally understand them!
Do you, dear citizen of the world, have any idea how big of an explosion an H-Bomb generates?
Did you not learn many important things in your institutionalized learning facilities created by the government?
Because if you do not know how large of an explosion an H-bomb can create, I will be more than happy to explain it to you: the exact amount varies, of course, depending on the size and the exact type of the bomb that is used, which is difficult information to find, unless one is a scientist, in which case they could probably explain such things to the reader with far more accuracy, but according to the more ignorant knowledge that some of us may have, even our military commanders had enough sense not to waste our more powerful nuclear devices during testing, as these were more than money to throw on a fire—the fire was highly radioactive, and it filled the atmosphere.
Thermonuclear weapons are frighteningly large (such is another name for an H-Bomb, or a hydrogen bomb, or whatever else one wishes to name them). Even though we have not tested these particular weapons a great deal, this does not mean that they are useless as a defense; indeed, the truth of fusion theory is quite the opposite: the few smaller versions that we did test were enough for us to prove that our combined creations are more than enough to engulf most of the surface of the Earth in fire—we could certainly destroy the more important aspects of humanity many times over. The “unknown” variables in our weapons’ detonations are a side effect of their vast theoretical use.
But then again, we are already being far too deductive in our thinking.
Even in the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I can not appeal to a high enough authority in order to convince the reader that such devices were unnecessary to use, even though Eisenhower would later become a President, in which case authority is a contradictory source. Yet, to this day, both Truman and Eisenhower are commonly held to be some of the better Presidents in U.S. history (this is strange when one considers how low the former’s approval ratings were for some time), even though Truman may have been convicted of massive genocide if a neutral nation had ruled the world. Nevertheless, these killings were not entirely Truman’s fault, so much as they were our entire nation’s fault, and we should not blame him alone; nor should we have had him drawn and quartered, and we should not have tortured him in the same manner that every Japanese civilian was injured.
There is, of course, an old saying: those who do not know their history will be doomed to repeat it; however, this is not necessarily true. Instead, assuming that we learn real history to begin with, those who do not dream of a different way to live in the future based upon what they have learned are doomed to repeat even greater mistakes than the past. Yet, before we specifically discuss the nuclear bombings of Japan, we should not forget to mention the massive conventional attacks that occurred shortly beforehand, which are to say—the firebombings of Tokyo. This city in particular was decimated by an exceptional amount of machinery: over 129 B-29s were utilized in the first raid, and a second raid utilized 334 bombers. All together, close to 500 sorties were flown in order to decimate the capitol: 80,000 Japanese civilians were killed during these attacks alone. But although the damage from these bombs was nearly as large as that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the amounts of aircraft and time required to kill such civilians were significantly greater.
To be precise, only three planes were needed in order to destroy Hiroshima, and one of the three planes was merely there for photographic purposes. With the advent of the nuclear age, a single B-29 became hundreds of times more powerful than it had been before. Some accounts by the Japanese during the initial nuclear attack seem to have viewed the bombers as being nothing more than scouts, or lost aircraft—yet, they produced more damage at once than any ordinary person of the time could have imagined: this was a quantum leap in technology.
The atomic weapons shocked the entire world with their force, which was, perhaps, a non-direct objective of their use—we may have wished to have sent the Russians a message more than anything else (if not to anyone else who may have become our enemy), which makes a very limited amount of additional sense, as we could have simply invited many foreign military commanders to Nevada years later, whereby we could have tested the weapons in front of them peacefully.
However, if one argues that testing such nuclear weapons on civilians was truly necessary in order for us to have deterred our enemies, we should surely feel safe by now, as it is indisputable that the United States’ greatest nuclear weaponry would not be developed until a few years after WWII.
In reality, the first atomic bombs were very weak in comparison to the bombs that were produced within the next twenty years. The initial nuclear weapons of the world were fission devices.
The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima only contained the destructive energy of 13,000 tons of TNT: this may seem as if it is an enormous amount of explosive power, but it is not.
The first thermonuclear explosion was created by the United States near the end of 1952—less than a decade after the first atomic weapons were used in Japan: the newer device was named Ivy Mike, and it was detonated on a small island by the name of Enewetak in the Marshall Islands; this piece of machinery contained the explosive power of 10.4 million tons of TNT. Thus, the tested device was over 400 times more powerful than that which was dropped on the Japanese.
Later fusion weapons would become even more destructive.
In 1954, the United States experimented with the first deliverable fusion weapon; it exploded with the force of fifteen million tons of TNT, which was 50% more powerful than Ivy Mike (for those that are too lazy to put two and two together, this means that this useable bomb was 600 times as powerful as that which was dropped on Nagasaki). The radiation from the test of the later device was beyond atrocious: over 7,000 square miles of the Earth were covered by nuclear fallout.
The Soviet Union, however, would set off the largest thermonuclear weapon by far when they detonated the Tsar Bomba: even this was only half the size of what they could have created in 1961. To put things simply, remember—the bomb of Hiroshima was only equal to 13,000 tons of TNT—the Tsar Bomba, on the other hand, was theoretically capable of being equal to 100,000,000 tons of TNT; in other words, this bomb could have been over 7,500 times as powerful as those which were dropped on Japan. The scaled-down version to be tested, however, was only half its potential size.
Nevertheless, a fifty megaton nuclear device is incredibly powerful. The tested weapon was capable of causing third-degree burns up to sixty miles away from the detonation site. This type of power is completely impractical in most respects, but then again, some seem to think that it is best to create the largest weapons possible, merely for the sake of making dreams, or nightmares, a reality. After all, the United States are not much more reasonable than the Soviet Union was, although our weapons are somewhat smaller. Our people do not like to make very large things so much as we love very plentiful, precise, and still somewhat large things.
How many weapons do we need?
Well, let us slow down even more and take things from the start.
Let’s really be precise about the military—since we have time: this isn’t a newscast, after all.

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